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Moral Responsibility, Justice, and Freedom 
Jonathan Smith 
 
Introduction 
 Metaphysical freedom has been a hotly debated topic within philosophy for 
millennia, and I would suggest that the debate continues because a decisive position 
on freedom is yet to be found, and in all likelihood, will never be found. For this 
reason, I am not interested in offering a comprehensive solution to the issues 
composing the discussion of metaphysical freedom. Rather, I desire to explore how 
one might reformulate the concept of metaphysical freedom in such a way as to 
make it consistent with compatibilism. Within this paper, I will exposit the four 
primary views of metaphysical freedom and proceed to identify how the common 
understanding of moral responsibility might be altered to be consistent with 
compatibilism. 
Four Primary Views of Metaphysical Freedom 
 Before discussing moral responsibility, it would be beneficial to present a 
method by which one can distinguish between the four primary positions on 
metaphysical freedom. In a multitude of articles written on metaphysical freedom, 
the authors find it sufficient to provide a vague or general understanding of the 
different positions, and yet on closer inspection, these descriptions leave room for 
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ambiguity. In this section, I will provide characterizations of the four positions in 
an attempt to alleviate any misunderstandings before entering the discussion of 
justice and responsibility. 
Libertarianism and Agency Theory 
 The four primary positions can be partitioned into two indeterministic 
positions and two deterministic positions. The first of the indeterministic positions 
is libertarianism. Libertarian freedom is often defined in terms of alternative 
actions. An action is free in the libertarian sense if and only if the agent acting could 
have done otherwise than he chose to do. However, as the compatibilist is prompt 
to respond, the use of the term ‘could’ in this definition is vague. If ‘could’ is 
understood to mean that an agent could do otherwise if he had desired to do 
otherwise, then the compatibilist might argue that his understanding of freedom 
satisfies this definition.1 For this reason, it is effective to understand these positions 
in terms of causal sufficiency. To do this, we can consider the set of all possible 
worlds, where each possible world is a maximal set of consistent states of affairs.2 
Then, as events occur in reality, the set of possible worlds that might obtain 
changes, depending on which events occur. 
 Now, as time elapses, elements are removed from the set of possible worlds. 
 
1 Van Inwagen, “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom,” in Metaphysics: the Big 
Questions, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 459. 
 
2 E.J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 130. 
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Working towards a definition, at any time t, we can partition the set of all possible 
states of affairs into the set of states of affairs that obtain with respect to the events 
preceding time t, and the set of states of affairs for which it is yet to be determined 
whether or not they will obtain with respect to the events preceding time t. We will 
call the first subset S1, and we will call the second subset S2. Notice that these two 
subsets are reliant on the time in which we are interested. Also, we place in S1 all 
of the states of affairs that will necessarily obtain but may not have yet been 
actualized. 
 At this point, we can distinguish between the indeterministic and the 
deterministic positions. Both the libertarian and the agency theorist hold that for 
some choices at some time t, where an agent is choosing between A or ~A, the set 
S1 contains neither A nor ~A, and consequently, S2 contains both A and ~A. Both 
the determinist and the compatibilist hold that for all choices at any time t, where 
an agent is choosing between A or ~A, S2 is the empty set, and S1 contains either 
A or ~A.  
From here, we can now draw the distinction between the agency theorist 
and the libertarian. The agency theorist distinguishes between what Chisholm terms 
“transeunt” and “immanent” causes.3 Transeunt causes are events while immanent 
causes are those causes brought about by the will of an agent. The agency theorist 
 
3 Roderick M. Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self,” in Metaphysics: The Big 
Questions, ed. Peter van Inwagen and Dean Zimmerman (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008), 444-
445. 
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posits that there is a sufficient cause for every event, but there are at least some 
uncaused immanent causes. In terms of the mechanics we have developed, for some 
choices at some time t, the agency theorist posits that while S1 at any time prior to 
t is insufficient to determine the outcome of the choice, the agent offers a 
contribution at time t such that the agent contribution in tandem with S1 is sufficient 
to determine the outcome of the choice. The libertarian in general, however, does 
not find the need to distinguish between transeunt and immanent causes. 
Determinism and Compatibilism 
 The distinction between determinism and compatibilism somewhat mirrors 
the distinction between agency theory and libertarianism. Just as the agency theorist 
draws a distinction between transeunt and immanent causes, the compatibilist 
draws a distinction between internal and external causes. However, while the 
agency theorist posits that certain causes may be uncaused, the compatibilist posits 
that both internal causes and external causes are themselves caused at all times. 
With respect to the mechanics of the previous section, the compatibilist claims that 
for every choice at every time t, S2 is the empty set, and yet S1 contains both causes 
internal to the agent as well as causes external to the agent. While this partition of 
S1 into internal and external causes does not alter the fact that compatibilism is a 
form of determinism, the partition is vital to understand the compatibilist’s 
understanding of freedom. 
 Freedom for the compatibilist rests upon the distinction between internal 
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and external causes. An action is free for the compatibilist if and only if the subset 
of S1 containing external causes alone is insufficient to determine the choice of the 
agent. In other words, S1 is only sufficient to determine the choice of the agent 
when containing some internal causes. With this being said, many compatibilists 
are comfortable with the claim that at least some internal causes are brought about 
by external causes alone. With this definition, it is easy to see how the 
compatibilist’s notion of freedom is consistent with determinism. However, 
whether compatibilism successfully accounts for the existence of moral 
responsibility will be discussed in the following sections.  
Moral Responsibility 
 In light of the previous discussion, I will attempt to offer a few views of 
moral responsibility and see how these views might relate to the positions outlined 
above. I will begin with the common understanding of moral responsibility and end 
with a formulation of moral responsibility that might coincide with the 
compatibilist notion of freedom. 
 The first view of moral responsibility is what I will term the ‘common-
sense’ view. Within the common-sense view, an agent is morally responsible for 
an action only if he performs the action freely – in the libertarian sense of the word 
‘free’ – and satisfies certain other conditions as well. In this way, libertarian 
freedom is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. However, while it might 
seem intuitive for an agent to be morally responsible for his action if and only if he 
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performs the action freely, there are multiple counterexamples demonstrating that 
the two concepts are not logically equivalent. In a paper written by Randolph 
Clarke, Clarke proposes three necessary conditions for moral responsibility outside 
of libertarian freedom.4 Each of the three conditions is supported by an example in 
which an agent acted freely and yet ought not be considered morally responsible 
for his actions. Since many philosophers seem to require conditions in addition to 
libertarian freedom to have moral responsibility, the common-sense view of moral 
responsibility will include any formulation of moral responsibility that includes 
libertarian freedom as a necessary condition. 
 While the common-sense view of moral responsibility is certainly the most 
prevalent within indeterministic circles, many determinists attempt to show that 
moral responsibility and determinism are in fact consistent with one another. These 
determinists are also implicitly claiming that libertarian freedom is not necessary 
for the existence of moral responsibility. In an article written by Alfred Mele, Mele 
attempts to demonstrate that there are some actions for which agents are morally 
responsible and yet not free.5 For our discussion, the soundness of Mele’s 
arguments is irrelevant. Instead, I am primarily interested in determining the 
 
4 Randolph Clarke, “Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility,” 
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 66, no.1 
(1992): 69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320296. 
 
5 Alfred Mele, “Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Does Either Require the Other?,” 
Philosophical Explorations 18, no. 3 (2015): 297. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2014.940061. 
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consequences of a theory of moral responsibility that does not include libertarian 
freedom as a necessary condition. Mele’s paper is relevant only in that it offers a 
few methods by which a determinist might alter the common-sense view to arrive 
at a form of moral responsibility compatible with determinism. Going forward, I 
will refer to any formulation of moral responsibility that does not include libertarian 
freedom as a necessary condition as a ‘complex’ view of moral responsibility. 
Complex Moral Responsibility and Justice 
 As one would expect, if an agent is morally responsible for any action in 
the common-sense view, then it follows that the agent has libertarian freedom. The 
contrapositive of this implication then requires the determinist to reject the 
existence of common-sense moral responsibility. Instead, the determinist will either 
deny the existence of moral responsibility or attempt to demonstrate that moral 
responsibility does not necessitate libertarian freedom. Since moral responsibility 
seems to be necessary for justice, many determinists are inclined to revise the 
notion of moral responsibility.  
 Before going forward with one specific complex view of moral 
responsibility, it would be helpful to understand exactly what conditions must be 
satisfied for justice to make sense. As one would expect, these criteria are difficult 
to identify, especially since justice is itself an abstract and elusive concept. For the 
sake of this paper, I am interested in the conditions that must be satisfied for 
retributive justice to make sense in response to some action. I narrow my discussion 
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to this aspect of justice because the majority of objections raised against 
deterministic positions begin with the assumption that retributive justice is 
warranted in response to at least some actions. While many determinists have 
argued that restorative justice and public safety are sufficient to make sense of 
criminal punishment within a deterministic world,6 I am interested in a notion of 
moral responsibility that allows for specifically retributive justice.  
Choices and Character 
 Before proposing a particular theory of moral responsibility that might be 
consistent with a deterministic view of metaphysical freedom, I would like to draw 
a distinction between choices that are worthy of punishment and a character that is 
worthy of punishment. The idea that some choices are worthy of retributive justice 
is the more intuitive of the two. By choices that are worthy of punishment, I am 
referring to the activity of an agent that leads to the completion of a morally vile 
act. For example, it is agreed upon almost universally that murder, when freely 
committed, is an act deserving of retribution.  
 Although society certainly holds agents accountable for their actions, I think 
there is also a tendency to hold agents accountable for their character, the often-
unexpressed components of an individual. For example, consider an agent, Bob, 
who – when placed in certain conditions – would freely murder Jane. However, 
 
6 John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, “Responsibility for Consequences,” in 
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility, ed. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), 324. 
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assume that Bob never finds himself surrounded by the sufficient conditions that in 
tandem with his character would lead him to commit the murder. Is Bob deserving 
of punishment as if he had committed the murder? Granted, being that humanity 
does not possess the kind of middle knowledge necessary to judge an individual for 
what he would have done when in a certain set of circumstances, it would never be 
appropriate to punish an individual for anything but the completed action, or one 
might argue the intent to act. However, assume that some human did, in fact, 
possess the middle knowledge necessary to make this kind of judgment. Bob, if he 
would have committed the murder, would not have control over the external 
circumstances that, in tandem with his character, would lead him to the murder. For 
this reason, there is a tendency to hold Bob accountable regardless of whether or 
not the murder is actually committed. 
 The notion of moral responsibility for which retributive justice is 
appropriate in response to a corrupt character is what I will call the ‘virtue’ theory 
of moral responsibility. Within this theory of moral responsibility, the actions of an 
agent are insignificant in comparison to the intent of the agent. While this concept 
does not immediately appear to offer a notion of moral responsibility for the 
determinist, further examination will yield how it might be helpful. 
Virtue Theory of Moral Responsibility and Compatibilism 
 Within the virtue theory of moral responsibility, an agent is morally 
responsible for an action if and only if the action is indicative of his character. For 
Smith 10 
 
Quaerens Deum  Spring 2020     Volume 5     Issue 1 
 
this reason, it is beneficial to partition the set of causes of an action into those causes 
that are internal to the agent and those causes that are external to the agent. Within 
the virtue theory of moral responsibility, only the internal causes are significant in 
determining moral responsibility. It is easy to see how this notion of moral 
responsibility coincides with the partition of S1 given in the description of 
compatibilism in the first section. Since the compatibilist claims that an agent is 
free if and only if S1 is insufficient to determine the agent’s action after removing 
internal causes, it follows that compatibilistic freedom and moral responsibility are 
logically equivalent given the virtue view of moral responsibility within a 
deterministic world. Of course, the virtue theory of moral responsibility is also 
consistent with the indeterministic theories of metaphysical freedom, and thus, the 
virtue theory, though a complex theory of moral responsibility, has fewer necessary 
conditions for an agent to be morally responsible.  
Christian Influences 
 When proposing the virtue theory of moral responsibility, it is easy to notice 
similarities with the Christian doctrine of sin. Consider the teachings of Jesus that 
extend the Old Testament law to focus primarily on the condition of the human 
heart in the sermon on the mount. For example, “I say to you that whoever looks at 
a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.”7 A 
 
7 Matthew 5:28. 
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few verses prior, Jesus also states, “You have heard that it was said to those of old, 
‘You shall not murder, and whoever murders will be in danger of the judgment.’ 
But I say to you that whoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in 
danger of the judgment.”8 One of the primary themes of the Sermon on the Mount 
is that God judges a man not only with respect to the evil actions that come to 
fruition but also with respect to the corruption of his character. In fact, the imagery 
of rebirth through saving faith in John 3 and the imagery of the stony heart being 
turned to flesh in Ezekiel 34 are just a few more examples of how sin is more than 
evil actions themselves. Rather, sin is presented as the cause by which evil actions 
are produced. Sin is an ontological corruption of mankind that, when left 
unchecked, results in reprehensible actions. 
 This understanding of sin seems to support the virtue theory of moral 
responsibility, being that the character of the acting agent is significantly more 
important than the action itself. Also, this understanding of sin seems to support the 
notion that God, an omniscient and perfectly just being, is both capable and intent 
to offer justice not only for what one does but also for what one is.  
Judgment 
 Finally, I will offer a few comments on the question that continues to loom 
for the indeterminist. The indeterminist might say something like the following: 
 
8 Matthew 5:21-22. 
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“Even if we were to adopt a virtue theory of moral responsibility, doesn’t this make 
punishment for immoral behavior unjust? If one cannot determine his own 
character, in what way is it fair for him to suffer for his character?” To answer this 
objection, it is important to make a distinction. There are two separate stages to this 
sort of question. The first stage involves whether good and evil entities ought to be 
glorified or condemned if the entity has no control over his own nature. The second 
stage involves how the entity came to be the way he is, and whether the sufficient 
cause for its nature ought to inherit the consequences of its moral standing. 
 With respect to the first stage, the alternative would be for evil entities to 
continue to exist unchanged, and if justice might be viewed as relegating all things 
to their proper spheres, it is hard for me to see how the non-condemnation of evil 
entities could ever be considered just. Of course, notice that it is not necessary for 
all evil entities to be condemned, but rather it is necessary for all evil entities to 
either be condemned or cease to be evil. This allows for God to be both just and 
redemptive. This stage of the question is unrelated to the second stage, and it is 
important to contemplate it separately. Regardless of which being is at fault for the 
existence of an evil entity, justice still requires that persistent evil entities are 
condemned. With respect to this first stage of the question alone, retributive justice 
still has a place, and human beings ridden with sin, regardless of the origin of the 
sin, must necessarily be condemned or changed by a just God. 
 With respect to the second stage, there have been many attempts to resolve 
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the paradox between an omnipotent and good creator that is also the sufficient cause 
in a deterministic universe for the existence of the very evil entities that receive His 
judgment. Contemplating this paradox would require much more space than can be 
given to the issue here, but it is important to notice that this stage of the question, 
though much more difficult to answer, does not impact the necessity of justice for 
entities with moral responsibility in the sense of the virtue theory. This being said, 
it might be helpful to consider the thoughts of Paul in Romans 9 where he writes: 
God has mercy on whom He wants to have mercy, and he hardens whom 
He wants to harden. One of you will say to me: ‘Then why does God still 
blame us? For who is able to resist His will?’ But who are you, a human 
being, to talk back to God? Shall what is formed say to the one who 
formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’ Does not the potter have the 
right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for special 
purposes and some for common use?9 
 
It is certainly a difficult doctrine to contemplate, but it seems like Paul’s treatment 
of this issue in Romans supports both a virtue theory of moral responsibility and a 
distinction between the first and second stages of the indeterminist’s objection. 
 In light of the above discussion, the virtue theory of moral responsibility 
would appear to account for retributive justice, being that the existence of evil 
character and its proper condemnation is independent of the origin of evil character. 
Moreover, the virtue theory of moral responsibility does not require the existence 
of alternative actions for morally significant choices, since the existence or non-
 
9 Romans 9:18-21. 
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existence of alternative choices is independent of the moral composition of the 
acting agent. 
Conclusion 
 Through the argumentation given in this paper, it has been shown that a 
virtue theory of moral responsibility, though it might fail to correspond to moral 
responsibility as it is in actuality, is a formulation of moral responsibility that is 
consistent with compatibilism and retributive justice. There is certainly work that 
can be done to more explicitly determine how a virtue theory of moral responsibility 
lends itself to assigning moral responsibility to agents in hypothetical scenarios, 
and it would be beneficial to offer a solution to the paradox given in the previous 
section. With this being said, we have determined that there are methods by which 
moral responsibility can be bent to account for different forms of justice and 
positions on metaphysical freedom. The virtue theory is simply one such 
manipulation that could prove to be beneficial for the compatibilist who desires to 
make sense of the existence of retributive justice in the absence of alternative 
actions.  
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